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Case 3 ∏ Trading in CO2 quotas
CO2 trading. A cost-efficient 
tool to achieve political goals?
ale x dubga ard
Let there be no doubt: Trading in CO2 reduction commitments does not in 
itself solve the greenhouse effect problems. The anthropogenic greenhouse 
effect can only be limited through physical changes in the form of reduced 
fossil fuel consumption, biological carbon sequestration and other measures 
that limit greenhouse gas build-up in the atmosphere. In other words, you 
cannot globally buy your way out of the problems. The purpose of CO2 trading 
is to realise the politically agreed reductions as cost-effectively as possible for 
society/the world in general. The overall objective is thus politically determined, 
while the market is used to allocate the agreed reduction between countries, 
producers and consumers. Not until then does it make sense to talk about 
‘buying your way out of the problems.’ By trading in CO2 reduction commit-
ments, individual countries and individual emitters can pay someone else to 
take over (some of ) their commitments, in much the same way as the normal 
division of labour between countries and producers in connection with the 
production of goods and services. The reasoning is also the same: Through a 
division of labour between countries and producers, considerable cost savings 
may be achieved – and thus potentially more welfare gained for all.
Cost-effectiveness
Thus, the purpose of CO2 trading is rather limited. It is not about giving priority 
to controlling the greenhouse effect over other national or global problems. 
This prioritisation takes place politically through the acceptance of reduction 
commitments before CO2 trading is implemented. Nor is it about how we get 
the best pollution control for a given sum of money. The justification for CO2 
trading is not that there is a specific sum of money available for controlling 
the greenhouse effect. As mentioned above, it is a political decision how much 
greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced – not how much it should cost. 
The economic rationale for CO2 trading is to realise the politically determined 
reduction target as cost-effectively as possible for society. It is thus a ques-
tion of employing cost-effective economic regulation instruments to realise an 
already adopted political objective.
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Kyoto Protocol Box 1
Under the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997, a number of industrialised 
countries and transition economies have committed themselves to reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions in the 2008-2012 period. Less developed participating 
countries have undertaken no quantitative reduction commitments. The Kyoto 
Protocol allows the participating countries to apply three flexible mechanisms 
to facilitate a cost-effective realisation of the reduction commitments:
1.  Emissions trading (ETS). The ETS means that industrialised countries reduc-
ing their emissions more than their commitment level can sell emission rights 
to other industrialised countries which want to emit more than permitted. 
Trade is conducted in terms of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). One AAU rep-
resents the tradable right to emit one metric ton of CO2-equivalent. Quota 
trading is described in more detail in Box 2.
2.  Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows the industrialised 
participating countries to fund projects which reduce the emission of green-
house gases in other countries – primarily less developed participating coun-
tries without reduction commitments. For each project, an independent 
commission must confirm that the reductions in question are additional 
reductions in relation to a realistic base line. The commission then issues 
Certified Emission Rights (CER) which are credited to the balance for emission 
reductions in the country funding the project.
3.  Joint Implementation (JI). JI allows the industrialised participating countries 
to fund emission-reducing projects in other countries with reduction commit-
ments and subsequently have the reduction credited to their own reduction 
obligations. If the host country meets a number of specific requirements, it 
may issue Emission Reduction Units (ERU) itself. If not, as is the case with the 
CDM, the reduction must be confirmed by an independent commission.
A network of national registers keeps track of the holdings of AAUs, CERs and 
ERUs which all represent one tonne of CO2 equivalents per unit. These units are 
called Kyoto units and together make up the individual country’s Kyoto account.
Under the so-called supplementary principle set out in the Kyoto Protocol, na-
tional emission reductions must constitute a significant element of the effort. 
How much a ‘significant element’ is in practice has not been specified in detail, 
but the EU argues that it should be at least 50 per cent of the total reduction 
commitment. In the Danish allocation plan for 2008-2012, an upper limit of 19 
per cent of the quota allocation (32.5 per cent for electricity production) has 
been set for the use of JI/CDM credits.
Sources: United Nations (1998) and 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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The regulation instruments cannot help define what the overall reduction 
target should comprise. To this end, economic analysis instruments such as 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis may be used. The purpose of a 
cost-benefit analysis is – in short – to identify the scope of socially optimal 
pollution reductions, whereas as a cost-effectiveness analysis is used to answer 
questions such as: How do we get the best environment/pollution control for a 
given sum of money (Pearce et al., 2006)? Economic analysis instruments will 
not be described in further detail here, as they are of no relevance in themselves 
to the issue of the pros and cons of CO2 trading.
One may ask why it should be cheaper to realise a given reduction target by 
letting the market determine the allocation of the reduction commitments. 
Here, it will be useful to first take a closer look at the Kyoto Protocol, which 
is described in Box 1. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the industrialised countries 
have committed themselves to individually agreed reductions in their green-
house gas emissions. The industrialised countries must together reduce their 
emissions by 5.2 per cent relative to their 1990 levels, whereas no quantitative 
reduction commitments are imposed on less developed countries. The EU 
has committed itself to a total reduction of 8 per cent, distributed among the 
member states in accordance with the EU’s Burden-Sharing Agreement from 
1998. Denmark and Germany agreed to reduce their emissions by 21 per cent, 
which, in the case of Germany, however should be seen in the light of the 
already implemented and expected closure of obsolete heavy industries. By 
comparison, the Netherlands must reduce its emissions by 6 per cent, France 
by 0 per cent, whereas Sweden has been granted permission to increase its 
emissions by 4 per cent. The background for the high emission reduction 
targets in Denmark and Germany is that both countries have relatively high 
emissions of greenhouse gases per inhabitant, among other things because a 
considerable share of their power generation is coal-fired. France and Sweden, 
on the other hand, have based a large proportion of their power generation on 
non-CO2-emitting nuclear power and hydropower.
The differences in reduction costs have to some extent been taken into consid-
eration when establishing the individual countries’ reduction commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol. However, considerable variations in the marginal re-
duction costs from country to country should be expected. In this context, mar-
ginal reduction costs means the reduction costs per tonne of CO2 equivalents 
in connection with successive reductions until the overall reduction target has 
been reached. At the beginning, it will generally be possible to obtain energy 
savings and technology improvements at low reduction costs, but once the 
low-hanging fruit has been picked, the marginal reduction costs will increase.
Differences in marginal reduction costs are what provides the rationale for 
CO2 trading. If the marginal reduction costs are higher in country A than in 
country B, it will be advantageous for the two countries to reallocate their re-
duction commitments, so that country A pays country B for assuming (a part) 
of country A’s reduction commitments. The same applies to companies with 
different marginal reduction costs. In a competitive CO2 market, reallocation 
 
194 alex dubgaard 
Ca
se
s
through trading transactions will continue until the marginal reduction costs 
have been equalised between countries and businesses. Equal marginal reduc-
tion costs for all polluters is the basic condition in environmental economics 
for social cost-effectiveness of pollution control (Perman et al., 2003). If this 
condition is met, no additional savings can be achieved by trading in reduc-
tion commitments.
CO2 trading enables flexible adjustment to the reduction requirements set 
out in the Kyoto Protocol under the conditions described in Box 1 and Box 2. 
Countries and companies with high marginal reduction costs will only reduce 
their emissions by a relatively small proportion and will instead buy CO2 emis-
The EU quota system for greenhouse gas emissions Box 2
The EU has adopted a directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading within the Community. The scheme 
covers a significant part of the energy sector and the energy-intensive 
industries. The purpose of the scheme is to contribute to a more cost-
effective reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases. Enterprises 
in the sectors covered by the quota system are allocated rights to emit 
a certain amount of greenhouse gases in the form of CO2 emission al-
lowances or quotas. The rights can be purchased and sold in the quota 
market. Enterprises which believe that they can profit from reducing 
their greenhouse gas emissions by more than is required according to 
their quota allocation are allowed to sell their quotas. Similarly, if an 
enterprise expects that it can profit from emitting more CO2 than its 
own emission allowances, it can buy quotas. In other words, enterprises 
can only exceed their emission allowance by paying other to keep their 
CO2 emissions correspondingly below their emission allowances. The 
total amount of emission allowances thus make up an EU ceiling on 
the CO2 emissions in the sectors covered by the scheme. 
Under the existing system, at least 90 per cent of the emission allow-
ances are free, whereas the rest are auctioned off. The European Com-
mission has, however, presented a proposal for a climate and energy 
package for the 2012-20 period in which the allocation of free emission 
allowances will gradually be replaced by the auctioning-off of quotas. 
In future, enterprises covered by the emission allowance trading system 
will have to pay for their entire emission of greenhouse gases. This cost 
will (to a greater or lesser extent) be transferred to consumers in the 
form of higher prices of electricity and other energy-intensive products. 
This will give consumers even stronger economic incentives to save 
energy and to reduce their consumption of energy-intensive products.
Source: The European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union (2003).
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sion quotas. These quotas will be offered by countries and companies with 
relatively low marginal reduction costs, which, in turn, will have to reduce 
their physical emissions correspondingly. As neither party may emit more 
than their respective quota, the overall reduction target will be realised as a 
result of this arrangement – and, what is more, at lower costs than without 
a reallocation of reduction commitments. The fact that the level of reduction 
varies geographically is irrelevant to the climate. The greenhouse effect of one 
CO2 equivalent is the same regardless of where it is emitted.
Objections to CO2 trading
The economic justification for CO2 trading is based on the ethical position 
that minimising the costs of achieving a social (e.g. environmental) objective 
is a good thing, all other things being equal. Cost minimisation means that 
there will be more resources (in the form of labour, capital etc.) available for 
other social purposes, such as the production of goods and services, addi-
tional environmental improvements or other things desired by society. Based 
on this assumption, CO2 trading contributes to increasing social welfare. It 
is based on this assumption that most economists recommend CO2 trading. 
The incorporation of the various flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol 
demonstrates that there is also political backing for this view.
But there are (of course) different opinions on CO2 trading. Some of the ob-
jections are economic by nature as they do not reject the ethical assumptions 
behind CO2 trading but question whether the assumptions regarding cost-
effectiveness/economic welfare gain will in fact be realised. It’s a frequent 
argument against CO2 trading that the money would be better spent on reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions at home rather than spending it abroad to buy 
CO2 quotas. Another objection made is that CO2 trading will enable Eastern 
European countries to sell emission allowances which they do not utilise today, 
thus eroding the reduction target set out in the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, some 
of the flexible mechanisms are criticised, as it is claimed that it is difficult to 
control whether there are real reductions behind the transactions. Some critics 
also dismiss, however, that cost savings can be seen as an ethically acceptable 
reason for allowing CO2 trading. The underlying ethical position is typically 
that we, as a society, have an obligation to take care of the pollution problems 
we create ourselves – and not pay our way out of it. We will start by taking a 
closer look at the economic points of criticism.
Is it (always) best to spend the money domestically?
As mentioned above, one of the arguments often put forward is that it must be 
best for society if the money is spent on greenhouse gas reductions at home 
instead of paying other countries to do so. This claim is typically based on 
two arguments: 1) If investments are made in domestic reduction measures, 
it will generate economic activity and employment in the country and thus 
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more welfare; 2) Supporting alternative energy and energy savings domesti-
cally will promote technological development and create first-mover benefits.
Major objections may be raised in both cases. It is, of course, correct that 
investments in local energy-saving measures will typically have an effect on 
employment. However, this is only a relevant economic argument if the labour 
(and capital) involved does not have alternative employment opportunities. In 
a situation characterised by labour shortages, the employment argument is of 
no relevance to society in general (but could be in fringe areas with permanent 
employment problems). Even if unemployment goes up, it is doubtful whether 
energy investments are a suitable instrument for reducing cyclical fluctuations, 
as climate policy should rest on long-term objectives and measures.
As for the development of new technologies, it is often overlooked that CO2 
trading per se will generate incentives for developing new technologies, as 
CO2 trading increases the costs of emitting greenhouse gases for producers 
and consumers. This in turn makes it economically more attractive to develop 
and implement energy-saving and renewable energy technologies. On the 
other hand, this does not mean that all technological development should 
be left to market forces alone. There are still reasons for supporting what is 
called learning-by-doing industries where a new technology must be applied 
to generate the improvements that may gradually render it competitive. That 
may justify subsidies for renewable energy technologies such as solar cells and 
wave energy. But it is important that these subsidies are phased out when the 
technology has reached a development stage where it can – or should be able 
to – compete under market conditions.
‘Hot air’
Due to a major economic decline since the collapse of communism, the green-
house gas emissions of Russia and the Ukraine have dropped more than their 
national reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The two countries 
have the option of selling their emission allowances in the quota market. 
Critics claim that trading in these surplus emission rights, also named hot air, 
will undermine the overall efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
criticism is, however, based on questionable (economic) assumptions. As the 
economy grows in Russia and the Ukraine, the emission of greenhouse gases 
will increase. The possibility of selling CO2 quotas to other countries means 
that, for society, there is a positive shadow price of increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions. The shadow price equals the price of CO2 emission allowances. In 
other words, CO2 trading will provide the same economic incentives for limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions, irrespective of whether a country has an emission 
allowance surplus or deficit. Without CO2 trading, the incentives for limiting 
the emission of greenhouse gases would be considerably smaller in countries 
with emissions below their emission allowance under the Kyoto Protocol.
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Control problems
Control problems in connection with CO2 trading are associated, in particular, 
with the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation instruments, which 
are described in detail in Box 1. In both instances, industrialised countries 
have the option of meeting some of their reduction commitments by funding 
projects which reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other (less developed) 
countries. An example of this is Denmark’s funding, under the Clean Development 
One of the most debated issues in connection with the Kyoto Protocol is the US aversion 
to mandatory greenhouse gas emission targets. Here, the environmental organisation 
Greenpeace offers its views on the possible outcome of non-US participation.
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Mechanism, of a power plant in Malaysia fired with biomass instead of diesel 
oil. Under the Joint Implementation scheme, Denmark is, among other projects, 
funding a geothermal project in Romania to replace lignite-based energy 
production. It may, of course, be difficult to decide whether the reductions in 
greenhouse gases would not have occurred anyway, i.e. to which extent the 
reductions are additional reductions. Still, the parties are not free to decide 
themselves how large a reduction a project will give. As explained in Box 1, 
independent bodies must approve the Certified Emission Rights and Emission Reduc-
tion Units issued under the two schemes. Finally, the supplementarity principle 
limits the extent to which CO2 trading can be used to meet the individual 
countries’ mitigation obligations – such as described in more detail in Box 1.
Ethical aspects
In the absence of CO2 trading, each country will have to reduce its own green-
house gas emissions to the extent specified by the Kyoto Protocol. It is prob-
ably a widely held opinion that this is the most reasonable approach – even 
though it may not be the least-cost solution for the participating countries. 
Most economists find it difficult to see the point of rejecting taxes on pollution 
or trading in pollution permits if it does not affect anyone negatively but only 
means that pollution control takes place at lower costs. In a climate context, 
it is irrelevant which countries reduce the emission of green house gases. The 
emission of greenhouse gases is a so-called uniform global pollution which 
has the same effect on the climate irrespective of where the emissions occur. 
Therefore, it does not matter which countries are reducing their emissions as 
long as total global emissions are reduced sufficiently.
Optimal or cost-effective use of society’s scarce resources play a central role 
in economic theory. The economic paradigm is based on consequentialist ethics 
where the ‘good’ which society should seek to achieve is the satisfaction of 
the desires and needs of its citizens to the highest extent possible (Hausman 
& McPherson, 1996). The needs of citizens are assumed to include goods and 
services in a wider sense, including the services delivered by the environment. 
Cost minimisation in connection with pollution control makes it possible to 
generate more of what citizens want. CO2 trading contributes to cutting the 
costs of controlling the greenhouse effect globally. It is therefore regarded as 
an economic control instrument which can promote the ‘good’.
Final observations – the market vs command and control
The market is not the only resource allocation instrument available to society. 
Resource allocation may also take place through command and control where 
polluters are given more or less detailed instructions as to what they should 
produce and how – or how much and by means of what technology they should 
reduce their pollution. But achieving cost-effectiveness in centrally controlled 
production activities requires huge amounts of information about production 
opportunities and technology. Historical experiences with centrally planned 
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economies have been conspicuously poor, and the political discussion about 
centrally planned economies vs market economies has practically ceased when 
it comes to the production of ordinary consumer and capital goods. Gradu-
ally, the notion of the advantages of the market has also had an impact on 
our views on how to organise pollution control. This has led to an increase in 
the use of incentive-based environmental control instruments – primarily in 
the form of green taxes and transferable pollution permits. It is important to 
note that the use of economic instruments does not imply that the definition 
of environmental objectives is left to the market. The extent to which pollution 
should be reduced is decided politically. It is then left to the market mechanism 
to allocate the reduction commitments among the polluters and, in connection 
with the Kyoto Protocol, also among the participating countries.
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Case 3 ∏ Trading in CO2 quotas
CO2 trading. Should you 
be able to buy your way 
out of the problems?
peder agger
In a market-dominated society, it is obvious to think that the problems with 
greenhouse gases are best solved by leaving them to the ‘market’. It is thus 
a question of, one way or the other, converting the relevant parts of the prob-
lems into commodities for which a price can be fixed and which can then be 
sold in the usual manner. Supply and demand will subsequently see to it that 
the costs are minimised and that the level and localisation of the production 
and consumption will be based on an overall consideration of what is most 
appropriate. As we live in a market-dominated society, I also believe that it is 
only natural that the market should contribute to at least some of the necessary 
regulation. But it is still a far cry from ‘buying your way out of the problems’. 
Below, I will try to explain why.
I will restrict myself to focusing on one type of commodity: the CO2 quotas, 
i.e. the right to emit specific quantities of carbon dioxide or quantities of 
other gases having a similar effect that the countries which have ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol are allowed to emit and thus also sell in the market. If the total 
quantity of emissions allowed is set just below what is required, a demand for 
permits, and thus a market for these, is created.
If a country wants to emit more CO2 than the quota allocated, it can either buy 
surplus quotas from another party or a documented reduction of a similar size 
must occur elsewhere, either as a result of reduced emissions or by binding 
extra CO2. The quota trading will typically take place between more or less 
developed industrialised countries, or when an industrialised country pays 
a developing country for increasing the use of renewable energy, increasing 
energy efficiency or by binding CO2 through flue gas purification, or in forests, 
in the soil or underground. The market is regulated by the so-called Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM). The arrangement may be in the form of so-called 
Joint Implementation where one country meets its reduction target by investing 
in a project in another country which can then achieve its reductions with less 
costs. This solution model is, however, characterised by significant drawbacks.
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Firstly, it is a drawback that even an ideally friction-free market will only be able 
to distribute the agreed total quantity of quotas in accordance with the laws 
of the market. The market cannot reduce the total quantity of quotas to the 
level where it should be. This can only be fixed politically, which is attempted 
on the international political scene when discussions are held to decide which 
nations should reduce their emissions to a given percentage of their 1990 level 
and by when. In addition, the quotas allocated were initially so generous (and 
free of charge) that it will take years before the quota system will have any 
serious impact on total emissions.
Another drawback is when a country’s CO2 reductions are only achieved by buy-
ing quotas abroad, which means that, as long as this situation applies, there 
will be no immediate incentive to develop technological or organisational solu-
tions in the country in question to reduce local CO2 emissions. Quota trading 
may thus further delay the necessary long-term changes of infrastructure and 
building layout which should preferably start today and not tomorrow. What 
The critical perspective: The Indian environmental activist Vandana Shiva has said 
the following about the Kyoto Protocol: »… Kyoto introduced a system of emissions 
trading which in effect rewards the polluters by assigning them rights to degrade the 
atmosphere and allowing trading in these rights … Today, the emissions trading market 
totals USD 30 billion and is expected to reach USD 1 trillion. Meanwhile carbon dioxide 
emissions continue to increase, as do emissions from polluting industrial activities« 
(Information 2008).
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is at stake is, in other words, not only the economy but also the consequences 
for technological development and the acquisition of knowledge.
Thirdly, there are also political problems: For ethical reasons, many citizens 
do not want us to shirk our responsibilities by trying to buy our way out of the 
problems in this way. It may even resemble an attempt at absolution – a sale 
of indulgences that relieves us from doing anything ourselves. We distance 
ourselves from the problem. We can lean back, make a few adjustments to our 
development aid and otherwise carry on as before. If no changes take place 
at home, the entire effort will be seen as ‘hot air’. This is where ethics comes 
into the picture. Economic rationality is not enough.
To make an impact – or to be accepted, at least – the policy must come from 
below: From the citizens, or rather from the citizens of the world who realise 
the necessity of this and who show solidarity with current and future genera-
tions. This realisation and solidarity will come and grow much more easily if 
the responsibility can also manifest itself in everyday life and through personal 
actions instead of through abstract appeals and complicated explanations. It 
is difficult for climate consciousness to manifest itself because greenhouse 
gases are invisible, there is a long way in terms of both time and space between 
cause and effect, and it may be difficult to see if our own minor contribution 
makes any difference at all.
Finally, there is the question of verifying whether words equate to action in this 
market: What was the emission level before? How much CO2 is actually bound? 
Can we be sure that it does not just result in increased emissions elsewhere 
or later? The problems of establishing reliable control systems are manifold.
In addition to the problems mentioned, i.e. establishing the total quantity of 
CO2, ensuring the technological development and build-up of knowledge, as 
well as the conscience and control aspects, there is the overall problem: That 
the emissions of greenhouse gases and the resulting change is not a simple, 
isolated problem which is easy to rank along with other, equally complex 
problems such as decreasing biodiversity, food shortages, poverty and health 
problems. The CO2 problem is, so to speak, just another element in the com-
plex of problems resulting from society’s techno structure and our way of life 
as it has developed historically and geographically and which is difficult to 
think of as a commodity.
“We have to prioritise,” is, however, the message from Bjørn Lomborg’s Co-
penhagen Consensus Conference which believes that fighting AIDS and ensuring 
clean drinking water should be given higher priority than controlling climate 
change, because “we cannot afford everything.” As if we have not been pri-
oritising so far. It is actually the only thing politics is about. And as if we have 
a choice, e.g. as if we can afford to do nothing about AIDS, drinking water or 
the climate. But if we cannot afford to do what is required, we still have to find 
the funds because there is no alternative. The necessary path has got a name. 
It is called sustainable development.
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Sustainable development is a form of development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the possibility of future generations to meet 
their own (United Nations, 1988). Since it first appeared, this concept has 
been incorporated as an objective in many contexts (amongst others in the 
Amsterdam Treaty), but has also been the subject of so many interpretations 
that the concept has been accused of being void and ripe for condemnation. 
It has, however, proved so persistent that it has created a framework for a 
discussion that differs from what we have been used to, because the concept 
contains a number of ethical requirements which, maybe not individually, but 
together contain important new elements. Today’s society must:
 π Take into account the needs of future generations
 π Ensure a fair distribution of resources among the world’s populations
 π Respect the limits imposed by the natural world
 π Contribute to bringing about a revitalisation of the economy: ‘Producing 
more with less.’
By linking environmental protection and development and by insisting on 
globality and the long-term perspective and equality, sustainable develop-
ment is a normative concept, which may be growth-oriented, but only within 
the framework dictated by the planet and the natural world. You can say that 
sustainable development is a way of organising complex political discussions 
where natural scientific rationality and normative arguments may contribute to 
a more coherent understanding. Relying on the market to ensure sustainable 
development would, as we will see, be even more far-fetched than thinking 
that it can solve the CO2 problems. The normative part of the sustainability 
concept is simply out of reach of the economy.
Where ethics is about values, politics is about how the value are distributed 
between the individual and the community, between existing and future gen-
erations, between humans and the natural world. Some of these values can be 
expressed in money terms. This means that the economy and the market still 
come into the picture as elements which, within certain political and temporal 
limits, may contribute to an appropriate distribution.
In addition to distributing commodities such as CO2 quotas, the market may 
also distribute the cash flows so that they move in the most profitable direction. 
This makes it possible to subject activities and projects to cost-benefit analyses 
(CBA) where the total costs and profits may be compared. Here, it is assumed 
that the different commodities or services can be substituted with others. In 
this way, the loss of rainforest in Brazil, for example, may be worthwhile and 
indicate growth if the forest felled provides space for more profitable farming. 
For some of nature’s vital functions, there is, however, a critical limit for how 
much can be substituted. Many biologists and economists, for example, see 
eye to eye on this. But there is major disagreement as to what functions and 
how much is involved. Put simply, the economists believe, and with some 
justification, that it is up to natural science to say what is so important that 
it should be left out of the ‘substitution accounts’. But natural science is very 
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reluctant to do so, among other things referring to the considerable uncertainty 
and lack of knowledge associated with this (Howarth, 2003).
CBA is an analysis tool which can help identify economically sound solutions 
and is, as such, neutral. Its application does, however, have some limitations 
which may serve to illustrate some of the innate weaknesses of the environ-
mental economy and thus also provide arguments for why CO2 trading is hardly 
able to solve all problems. The shortfalls may be summarised thus:
1. Lack of data and knowledge
2. Unclear or inadequate welfare goal
3. Methodological problems
4. Lack of long-term perspective
Re 1) When embarking on a calculation of economic sustainability, the lack 
of data is often significant. For example, when the Danish Economic Councils 
in 1998 set out to calculate whether Denmark was experiencing sustainable 
development, they had to confine their investigation to only looking at changes 
in the natural capital within the extraction of oil and natural gas, emissions of 
greenhouse gases and certain air pollutants, i.e. they restricted themselves to 
only looking at some of the most centralised and thoroughly controlled and, 
thus, well-documented elements of Danish production and emission. In ad-
dition, no data exist on some very important areas, i.e. not only data but an 
actual understanding of how things work.
Re 2) Cost-benefit analyses (CBA) are based on a welfare-economic theory 
which believes that it can provide the most effective prioritisation of the ben-
efits of society based on the normative perception that the goal is the fulfilment 
of the population’s preferences. CBA cannot, however, decide which prefer-
ences are ‘good’ because one benefit may substitute the other. When the same 
formula is applied to all values, the political debate on value-relational issues, 
which is otherwise the essence of politics, is, so to speak, closed down. It is a 
problem, because in a liberal democracy each person is not only a consumer 
but also a citizen, and we want both to satisfy our own preferences and to dis-
cuss goals and visions on how society should be organised, ideas which make 
sense in our lives and which define our identity. CBA does not have any visions 
and is unable to set an upper limit for the total production. The economist 
Herman Daly has described it as follows: If you see economics as a ship that is 
being loaded, the market mechanism is likely to help place the cargo so that 
the ship does not capsize. But it cannot prevent the loading from continuing 
until the water is above the railings and the ship sinks.
Re 3) CBA requires perfect competition in all markets, which means that a 
market price exists for all commodities, or that it, at least, can be estimated 
with some degree of certainty. Willingness-to-pay analyses will get you some 
of the way. Some of the criticism voiced against the economists’ work in this 
field may be based on a criticism of the gross domestic product (GDP) as an 
expression of welfare. GDP is, for example, not capable of including income 
distribution, unpaid labour, the black economy, health, education, freedom, 
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security, peace, pollution, depletion of resources, cancer and crime. The eco-
nomic sustainability concept is, to some extent, able to take into account 
many of these elements. An example of the problems which willingness-to-pay 
analyses are facing is that some population groups do not answer questions 
about the value of nature based on a CBA-based prioritisation, but carry out a 
value-rational weighing instead, perhaps because they confer rights on nature 
that we must respect. The balance between these different sets of values exists 
in the political process – not in the market. It is simply not possible to fix a 
price for several of the amenities that we want to pass on to future generations. 
The things in question are phenomena such as burial mounds and natural 
forests as well as the intangible value related to these, e.g. memories, sense 
of identity and aesthetic experiences.
Re 4) Climate change and biodiversity are processes that evolve over decades 
and centuries whereas the perspective of markets and economies is usually 
weeks, months and years. This timescale discrepancy is yet another source of 
limitation of CBA. Who dares, for example, predict the price of oil 50 years 
from now? This we need to know for a CBA to be taken seriously in the long 
term. Future expectations can be expressed in the so-called discount rate, 
which is the percentage rate of growth that one Danish krone, euro or dollar 
must be given in the next period to correspond to one Danish krone, euro or 
dollar today. If a high capitalisation rate is set, the expectations of the annual 
yield are high, and if a low rate is set, they are low. Calculations of long-term 
environmental and energy investments are thus extremely sensitive to the 
capitalisation rate used. In most countries, it is set lower (2-3 per cent) than 
in Denmark, where the number crunchers at the Ministry of Finance set it high 
(6-7 per cent). The future does not seem to be of much value to them.
Could one imagine an ethical cost-benefit analysis? An analysis where the 
good things are weighed against the bad? This requires that all the good and 
bad thing can be substituted, i.e. included in the same formula. I will not 
deny that this is possible to some extent. But the nature of such an analysis 
means that it cannot be left to computers and number crunchers. It must be 
based on a political dialogue on the many new dilemmas brought about by 
international developments and which, ultimately, is about how we want to 
live on this planet.
As part of a sustainable development, climate change must be something 
we both try to counter and adapt to. But CO2 trading neither can nor should 
be the main way to solve the climate problem. For market-dependent short-
sighted business interests, a market solution is attractive. But for the long-term 
interests of the community, it can only be a temporary and limited means 
in a long-term strategy based on scientifically acknowledged conditions of 
existence and on all values, also those which the economy cannot grasp but 
which are crucial for the individual and for the political process.
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Case 3 ∏ Trading in CO2 quotas
Study questions
1  What are the main arguments for and against CO2 trading according to 
the two authors?
2  Do they mainly disagree on scientific or value-based issues?
3  In which way do the two authors’ descriptions of the Kyoto Protocol mecha-
nisms differ?
4  Which role may cost-benefit analysis play in connection with CO2 trading 
according to the two authors – and what are their arguments?
5  Which consequences will CO2 trading have for the development of tech-
nologies according to the two authors?
7  What ethical questions does CO2 trading raise according to the two au-
thors?
